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INDUSTRY INFLUENCE IN FEDERAL REGULATORY AGENCIES.

By

Paul J. Quirk. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1981. Pp. xi,
260. $19.50.
A common criticism of federal regulatory agencies is that they are subject to excessive influence from regulated industries. This influence induces
regulatory officials to protect and even promote corporate economic interests, while neglecting the interests of the consumer and the public. 1 Commentators have offered a variety of economic2 and political3 theories to
explain industry influence.
In Industry Influence in Federal Regulatory Agencies, Paul Quirk examines and questions the view that regulatory officials have personal and
career incentives to promote policies favorable to industry. In particular,
Quirk empirically considers whether regulatory officials have "pro-industry" incentives resulting from pre-appointment policy views, budgetary
concerns, and future employment aspirations in regulated industry. 4 Based
on his research, Quirk concludes that the incentives hypothesis 5 "cannot be
considered to provide an explanation of any overwhelming pro-industry
bias often attributed to regulatory agencies. The incentives examined only
irregularly support such behavior" (p. 177).
Quirk's conclusions about the incentives hypothesis are based on interviews with fifty high-level officials in four regulatory agencies. 6 This methodology differs from more traditional approaches, which have attempted to
describe the decision-making process of regulatory agencies (p. 34). Such
descriptions help explain "who interacts with whom" and "the gathering of
facts, weighing of arguments, and so on" (p. 34), but may overlook "states
of mind (values, beliefs, hopes, fears, etc.)" (p. 35) that affect regulatory
decisions. Quirk's reliance on interviews with high-ranking regulatory officials is unique because it "examine[s] some of the policy incentives actually
I. Some proponents of this view contend that regulatory agencies have been captured by
industry. In its extreme form, the "capture" theory over-simplifies regulatory politics by setting up "industry" and "the public" as two diametrically opposed antagonists. As one commentator notes, the theory depicts "a Manichean struggle between a discrete and powerful
'corporate interest' and an equally well-defined, but politically feeble, consumer (or 'public')
interest. Finally, that struggle, which is nothing but the interaction of those two vectors of
force, leads to only one, melancholy outcome." Schuck, Book Review, 90 YALE L.J. 702, 705
(1981) (reviewing J. DELONG, THE POLITICS OF REGULATION (1980)).
2. See Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. EcoN. & MGMT. Sc1. I
(1971).
3. See T. Low,, THE END OF LIBERALISM (1969); M. BERNSTEIN, REGULATING BUSINESS
BY INDEPENDENT COMMISSION (1955).
4. Quirk's study does not test whether these incentives actually influence regulatory behavior. Rather, the study simply tests whether such incentives exist.
5. The terms "theory" and "hypothesis" are used interchangeably in this review. See THE
AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 1335 (rev. New College ed. 1975).
6. The four agencies are the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB), the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), and the National Highway Traffic
Safety Administration (NHTSA).
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facing regulatory agencies and officials, by more or less direct observation
and measurement of those incentives (as perceived)" (p. 34).
Quirk's analysis first focuses on the "pro-industry appointments hypothesis." This view theorizes that officials are appointed to regulatory agencies
because they are sympathetic to industry desires and consequently their
views provide an incentive to support industry interests.7 To test this theory, Quirk asked officials to describe the policy views they held on regulatory issues prior to appointment. Quirk then coded each answer into one of
the following categories: "anti-industry"; "moderate"; "pro-industry";
"program supporter"; or "no attitudes." Quirk found that 44 percent of the
respondents held "anti-industry" policy attitudes when appointed, compared to only 20 percent with "pro-industry" views (p. 49). Further, the
majority of officials did not believe their policy views were even taken into
account when they were appointed. Rather, most officials believed experience, professional skills, managerial ability, and personal traits were important factors in their appointments (pp. 75-76). Clearly, these results do not
support the theory that agency officials are selected because they sympathize with industry interests.
In the second part of the interview, Quirk questions the theory that regulatory officials protect industry interests in order to maintain budgetary
support from the Administration and Congress, and insure stability and
growth of their agencies. The results in this section show no "generalper se
pro-business incentives - that is, perceptions that decisions favored by industry across a wide range of issues would improve budgetary prospects"
(p. 133). To the contrary, in one agency, the FTC, officials "overwhelmingly reported that the agency's recent activism has had favorable effects on
support for the agency's budget . . . ." (p. 108). Again, the results of this
section of the study do not confirm the pro-industry incentives hypothesis.
Finally, Quirk tests the theory that agency officials protect industry interests in order to enhance future employment opportunities. Of the three
incentives studied, this was "the most consistently pro-industry" (p. 176).
An interesting anomaly, however, is that career incentives in the FTC
"work in the opposite of the hypothesized direction" (p. 164). In the FTC,
"[i]t is considered beneficial to demonstrate aggressiveness and effectiveness
in enforcement, despite the fact that such behavior increases the regulatory
burden on industry" (p. 164). Becaus~ the FTC is primarily staffed by lawyers, who are perceived as likely to exhibit these characteristics in any employment capacity, Quirk suggests that such characteristics will make them
"attractive potential employee[s] of the private sector" (p. 172).
Following his analysis of these incentives, Quirk considers possibilities
for minimizing industry influence in regulatory agencies. Quirk's data on
the FTC argue against the uniform application of one commonly proposed
reform - a ban that would prohibit regulatory officials from accepting employment in regulated industries for a specified period of time after leaving
their agencies. Indeed, to the extent that prospective employers place a pre7. Quirk explains that he "refer[s] to this hypothesis as one involving incentives in the
sense that one who holds a certain policy attitude has an incentive to support policies favored
by that attitude." P. 23.
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mium on the aggressive pursuit of agency objectives, an indiscriminate employment ban would prove counterproductive as well as fruitless (p. 190).
However, Quirk does offer suggestions for (1) "reducing the large
number of appointees with no particular pre-appointment attitudes, and replacing them with strongly consumer or other general interest-oriented individuals" (p. 181), and (2) eliminating any pro-industry budgetary
incentives. At the same time, he acknowledges that many proposed regulatory reforms might create even more new problems while simultaneously
"contribut[ing] to the much lamented complexity, rigidity, and cumbersomeness of government" (p. 183).
Quirk's study, while creatively designed to provide fresh insights into
industry influence in regulatory agencies, has some important methodological shortcomings. Initially, "capture" theory adherents, who believe that
regulatory officials represent the fox guarding the chickens, might not be
convinced by a study in which the foxes are asked whether they are protecting the chickens. In short, there is no guarantee that Quirk received completely candid and honest answers about pro-industry incentives from
people entrusted to represent and protect the public. Further, some regulatory officials may have understated the significance of pro-industry incentives in order to reduce cognitive dissonance. For example, it would not be
surprising if some officials who held views sympathetic to industry interests
when appointed later denied they ever held such views.
Another problem, one inherent in a study based on "open-ended" questions, is that the interviewer inevitably injects his own biases into the process of "coding" general answers into the categories that are being studied.
In this respect, the study is far less scientific than one in which the respondents answer narrow questions from a given set of responses. To his credit,
Quirk recognizes and addresses this problem in the chapter "Comment on
Coding" (p. 200), and acknowledges that the study is "really quite rudimentary with respect to conceptualization, data collection, and measurement"
(p. 193).
Despite these methodological shortcomings, Quirk's research does provide a "rough measurement" (p. 33) of the three incentives studied. His
work underscores the need for further related research and provides an experimental research method on which further studies can be based.

